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Abstract
Verifying the identity of a person using handwritten signatures is challenging in the presence
of skilled forgeries, where a forger has access to a person’s signature and deliberately attempt to
imitate it. In offline (static) signature verification, the dynamic information of the signature writ-
ing process is lost, and it is difficult to design good feature extractors that can distinguish genuine
signatures and skilled forgeries. This reflects in a relatively poor performance, with verification
errors around 7% in the best systems in the literature. To address both the difficulty of obtaining
good features, as well as improve system performance, we propose learning the representations
from signature images, in a Writer-Independent format, using Convolutional Neural Networks.
In particular, we propose a novel formulation of the problem that includes knowledge of skilled
forgeries from a subset of users in the feature learning process, that aims to capture visual cues
that distinguish genuine signatures and forgeries regardless of the user. Extensive experiments
were conducted on four datasets: GPDS, MCYT, CEDAR and Brazilian PUC-PR datasets. On
GPDS-160, we obtained a large improvement in state-of-the-art performance, achieving 1.72%
Equal Error Rate, compared to 6.97% in the literature. We also verified that the features gener-
alize beyond the GPDS dataset, surpassing the state-of-the-art performance in the other datasets,
without requiring the representation to be fine-tuned to each particular dataset.
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1. Introduction
Signature verification systems aim to verify the identity of individuals by recognizing their
handwritten signature. They rely on recognizing a specific, well-learned gesture, in order to iden-
tify a person. This is in contrast with systems based on the possession of an object (e.g. key,
smartcard) or the knowledge of something (e.g. password), and also differ from other biometric
systems, such as fingerprint, since the signature remains the most socially and legally accepted
means for identification [1].
In offline (static) signature verification, the signature is acquired after the writing process is
completed, by scanning a document containing the signature, and representing it as a digital im-
age [2]. Therefore, the dynamic information about the signature generation process is lost (e.g.
position and velocity of the pen over time), which makes the problem very challenging.
Defining discriminative feature extractors for offline signatures is a hard task. The question
“What characterizes a signature” is a difficult concept to implement as a feature descriptor, as
illustrated in Figure 1. This can be observed in the literature, where most of the research efforts
on this field have been devoted to finding a good representation for signatures, that is, designing
feature extractors tailored for signature verification, as well as using feature extractors created for
other purposes [3]. Recent work uses texture features, such as Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [4], [5]
and Gray-Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM) [5]; directional-based features such as Histogram
of Oriented Gradients (HOG) [4] and Directional-PDF [6], [7]; feature extractors specifically de-
signed for signatures, such as the estimation of strokes by fitting Bezier curves [8]; among others.
No feature extractor has emerged as particularly suitable for signature verification, and most recent
work uses a combination of many such techniques.
The difficulty of finding a good representation for signatures reflects on the classification per-
formance of signature verification systems, in particular to distinguish genuine signatures and
skilled forgeries - forgeries that are made targeting a particular individual. When we consider ex-
periments conducted on large public datasets, such as GPDS [9], the best reported results achieve
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Figure 1: Examples of challenges in designing feature extractors for offline signatures, and the challenge of classifying
skilled forgeries. Each column shows two genuine signatures from the same user in the GPDS dataset, and a skilled
forgery created for the user. We notice that skilled forgeries resemble genuine signatures to a large extent. Since we
do not have examples from the forgery class for training, the problem is even more challenging. We also note the
challenges of creating feature extractors for these genuine signatures: (a) The shape of the first name is very different
among the two genuine samples. A feature descriptor based on grid features would have very different vectors for
the two samples. (b) The shape of the characters in the first name (“Paula”) is very different. An analysis based
on the design of individual letters would perform poorly for this user. (c) Large variation in flourishes may impact
directional-based descriptors (such as HOG or D-PDF). (d) For some users, it is difficult to pinpoint the common
attributes of two signatures even after carefully analyzing the samples.
Equal Error Rates around 7%, even when the number of samples for training is around 10-15, with
worse results using fewer samples per user.
To address both the issue of obtaining a good feature representation for signatures, as well as
improving classification performance, we propose a framework for learning the representations
directly from the signature images, using convolutional neural networks. In particular, we propose
a novel formulation of the problem, that incorporates knowledge of skilled forgeries from a subset
of users, using a multi-task learning strategy. The hypothesis is that the model can learn visual cues
present in the signature images, that are discriminative between genuine signatures and forgeries in
general (i.e. not specific to a particular individual). We then evaluate if this feature representation
generalizes for other users, for whom we do not have skilled forgeries available.
Our main contributions are as follows: 1) we present formulations to learn features for offline
signature verification in a Writer-Independent format. We introduce a novel formulation that uses
skilled forgeries from a subset of users to guide the feature learning process, using a multi-task
framework to jointly optimize the model to discriminate between users (addressing random forg-
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eries), and to discriminate between genuine signatures and skilled forgeries; 2) we propose a strict
experimental protocol, in which all design decisions are made using a validation set composed of
a separate set of users. Generalization performance is estimated in a disjoint set of users, from
whom we do not use any forgeries for training; 3) we present a visual analysis of the learned
representations, which shows that genuine signatures and skilled forgeries get better separated in
different parts of the feature space; 4) lastly, we are making two trained models available for the
research community1, so that other researchers can use them as specialized feature extractors for
the task.
Experiments were conducted on four datasets, including the largest publicly available signature
verification dataset (GPDS), achieving a large performance improvement in the state-of-the-art,
reducing Equal Error Rates from 6.97% to 1.72% in GPDS-160. We used the features learned on
this dataset to train classifiers for users in the MCYT, CEDAR and Brazilian PUC-PR datasets,
also surpassing the state-of-the-art performance, and showing that the learned feature space not
only generalizes to other users in the GPDS set, but also to other datasets.
Preliminary results, using only genuine signatures for learning the features, were published
as two conference papers. In [10], we introduced the formulation to learn features from genuine
signatures from a development dataset, using them to train Writer-Dependent classifiers to another
set of users. In [11], we analyzed the learned feature space and optimized the CNN architecture,
obtaining state-of-the-art results on GPDS. The present work includes this formulation of the prob-
lem for completeness, with additional experiments on two other datasets (MCYT and CEDAR), a
clearer explanation of the method and the experimental protocol, as well as the novel formulation
that leverages knowledge of skilled forgeries for feature learning.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related work on
signature verification and on feature learning techniques. Section 3 details the formulation and
methodology to learn features for offline signature verification, and section 4 describes our exper-
imental protocol. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of our experiments. Lastly, section
6 concludes the paper.
1https://www.etsmtl.ca/Unites-de-recherche/LIVIA/Recherche-et-innovation/
Projets
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2. Related works
The review of related works is divided below into two parts: we first present a review of previ-
ous work on Offline Signature Verification, followed by a brief review of representation learning
methods.
2.1. Related works on Offline Signature Verification
The area of automatic Offline Signature Verification has been researched at least since the
decade of 1970. Over the years, the problem has been addressed from many different perspectives,
as summarized by [12], [13] and [2].
In this problem, given a set of genuine signatures, the objective is to learn a model that can
distinguish between genuine signatures and forgeries. Forgeries are signatures not created by a
claimed individual, and are often subdivided into different types. The most common classification
of forgeries in the literature considers: Random Forgeries, where a person uses his or her own
signature to impersonate another individual, and Skilled Forgeries, where a person tries to imitate
the signature of the claimed individual. While the former is a relatively easier task, discriminat-
ing skilled forgeries is an open pattern recognition problem, and is the focus of this paper. This
problem is challenging due to a few factors: First, there is a large similarity between genuine sig-
natures and skilled forgeries, as forgers will attempt to imitate the user’s signature, often practicing
the signature beforehand. Second, in a practical application scenario, we cannot expect to have
skilled forgeries for all users in the system, therefore the classifiers should be trained only with
genuine signatures in order to be most widely applicable. Lastly, the number of genuine samples
per user is often small, especially for new users of the system, for whom we may have only 3 or
5 signatures. This is especially problematic as many users have large intra-class variability, and a
few signatures are not sufficient to capture the full range of variation.
There are mainly two approaches for building offline signature verification systems. The most
common approach is to design Writer-Dependent classifiers. In this scenario, a training set is
constructed for each user of the system, consisting of genuine signatures as positive examples and
genuine signatures from other users (random forgeries) as negative samples. A binary classifier
is then trained on this dataset, resulting in one model for each user. This approach has shown
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to work well for the task, but since it requires one model to be trained for each user, complexity
increases as more users are enrolled. An alternative is Writer-Independent classification. In this
case, a single model is trained for all users, by training a classifier in a dissimilarity space [8],
[7]. The inputs for classification are dissimilarity vectors, that represent the difference between
the features of a query signature, and the features of a template signature (a genuine signature of
the user). In spite of the reduced complexity, Writer-Independent systems often perform worse,
and the best results in standard benchmarks are obtained with Writer-Dependent systems.
A large variety of feature extractors have been investigated for this problem, from simple geo-
metric descriptors [14], [15], descriptors inspired in graphology and graphometry [16], directional-
based descriptors such as HOG [4] and D-PDF [17], [6], [7], descriptors based on interest-point,
such as SIFT [4], to texture descriptors, such as Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [4] and Gray-Level
Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM) [5]. These features are commonly extracted locally from the sig-
nature images, by dividing the image in a grid and computing descriptors for each cell (either in
Cartesian or polar coordinates).
Methods to learn features from data have not yet been widely explored for offline signature ver-
ification. Ribeiro et al. [18] used Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBMs) to learn features from
signature images. However, in this work they only showed the visual appearance of the weights,
and did not test the features for classification. Khalajzadeh [19] used Convolutional Neural Net-
works (CNNs) for signature verification on a dataset of Persian signatures, but only considered
the classification between different users (e.g. detecting random forgeries), and did not consid-
ered skilled forgeries. Soleimani et al. [20] proposed a solution using deep neural networks for
Multitask Metric Learning. In their work, a distance metric between pairs of signatures is learned.
Contrary to our work, the authors used handcrafted feature extractors (LBP in the experiments with
the GPDS dataset), while in our work the inputs to the system are the signature themselves (pixel
intensities), and the feature representation is learned. In a similar vein to our work, Eskander [7]
presented a hybrid Writer-Independent Writer-Dependent solution, using a Development dataset
for feature selection, followed by training WD classifiers using the selected features. However, in
the present work we use a Development dataset for feature learning instead of feature selection.
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2.2. Related work on Representation Learning for computer vision tasks
In recent years, there has been a large interest in methods that do not rely on hand-crafted
features, but rather learn the representations for a problem using raw data, such as pixels, in the
case of images. Methods based on learning multiple levels of representation have shown to be very
effective to process natural data, especially in computer vision and natural language processing
[21], [22], [23]. The intuition is to use such methods to learn multiple intermediate representations
of the input, in layers, in order to better represent a given problem. In a classification task, the
higher layers amplify aspects of the input that are important for classification, while disregarding
irrelevant variations [23]. In particular, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [24] have been
used to achieve state-of-the-art performance [23] in many computer vision tasks [25], [26]. These
models use local connections and shared weights, taking advantage of the spatial correlations of
pixels in images by learning and using the same filters in multiple positions of an input image [23].
With large datasets, these networks can be trained with a purely supervised criteria. With small
datasets, other strategies have been used successfully, such as unsupervised pre-training (e.g. in a
greedy layer-wise fashion [27]), and more recently with transfer learning [28], [29], [30]. CNNs
have been used to transfer learning of representations, by first training a model in a large dataset,
and subsequently using this model in another task (often, a task for which a smaller dataset is
available), by using the network as a “feature extractor”: performing forward-propagation of the
samples until one of the last layers before softmax [28], [29], or the last layer (that corresponds
to the predictions for classes in the original task, as in [30]), and using the activation at that layer
as a feature vector. Alternatively, this pre-trained model can be used to initialize the weights of a
model for the task of interest, and training proceeds normally with gradient descent.
3. Feature learning for Signature Verification
In this work we present formulations for learning features for Offline Signature Verification,
and evaluate the performance of such features for training Writer-Dependent classifiers. We first
note that a supervised feature learning approach directly applied for Writer-Dependent classifica-
tion is not practical, since the number of samples per user is very small (commonly around 1-14
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samples), while most feature learning algorithms have a large number of parameters (in the order
of millions of parameters, for many computer vision problems, such as object recognition [25]).
On the other hand, we expect that signatures from different users share some properties, and we
would like to exploit this intuition by learning features across signatures from different writers.
We consider a two-phase approach for the problem: a Writer-Independent feature learning
phase followed by Writer-Dependent classification. The central idea is to leverage data from
many users to learn a feature space that captures intrinsic properties of handwritten signatures. We
subsequently train classifiers for each user, using this feature space, that model the characteristics
of each user. Since in real applications the list of users of the system is not fixed, we consider a
disjoint set of users for learning the features and training the writer-dependent classifiers, to verify
if the learned feature space is useful (i.e. generalizes) to new users. We use the term Writer-
Independent for the feature learning process, since the learned representation space is therefore
not specific for a set of users.
Given a development set D of signatures, we train Deep Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) using the formulations defined below. Subsequently, we use the trained network to project
the input signatures onto the representation space learned by the CNN for an Exploitation set E ,
and train a binary classifier for each user. The hypothesis is that genuine signatures and forg-
eries will be easier to separate in this feature space, if the network succeeds in capturing intrinsic
properties of the signatures, that generalizes to other users.
Convolutional Neural Networks are a particularly suitable architecture for signature verifica-
tion. This type of architecture scales better than fully connected models for larger input sizes,
having a smaller number of trainable parameters. This is a desirable property for the problem at
hand, since we cannot reduce the signature images too much without risking losing the details
that enable discriminating between skilled forgeries and genuine signatures (e.g. the quality of the
pen strokes). We also note that this type of architecture shares some properties with handcrafted
feature extractors used in the literature, as features are extracted locally (in an overlapping grid
of patches) and combined in non-linear ways (in subsequent layers). In the sections below we
present our proposed formulations for the problem, first considering only genuine signatures, and
then considering learning from skilled forgeries.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the CNN architecture used in this work. The input image goes through a sequence of transfor-
mations with convolutional layers, max-pooling layers and fully-connected layers. During feature learning, P (y|X)
(and also P (f |X) in the formulation from sec 3.2.2) are estimated by performing forward propagation through the
model. The weights are optimized by minimizing one of the loss functions defined in the next sections. For new
users of the system, this CNN is used to project the signature images onto another feature space (analogous to “extract
features”), by performing feed-forward propagation until one of the last layers before the final classification layer,
obtaining the feature vector φ(X).
3.1. Learning features from genuine signatures
Let D be a dataset consisting of genuine signatures from a set of users YD. The objective is to
learn a function φ(X) that projects signatures X onto a representation space where signatures and
forgeries are better separated. To address this task, we consider learning a Convolutional Neural
Network to discriminate between users in D. This formulation has been introduced in [10], and it
is included here for completeness.
Formally, we consider a training set composed of tuples (X, y) where X is the signature im-
age, and y is the user, that is, y ∈ YD. We create a neural network with multiple layers, where the
objective is to discriminate between the users in the Development set. The last layer of the neural
network has M units with a softmax activation, where M is the number of users in the Develop-
ment set, (M = |YD|), and estimates P (y|X). Figure 2 illustrates one of the architectures used in
this work, with M = 531 users. We train the network to minimize the negative log likelihood of
the correct user given the signature image:
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L = −
∑
j
yij logP (yj|Xi) (1)
Where yij is the true target for example i (yij = 1 if the signature belongs to user j), Xi is the
signature image, and P (yj|Xi) is the probability assigned to class j for the input Xi, given by the
model. This cost function can then be minimized with a gradient-based method.
The key idea behind this approach is that by training the network to distinguish between users,
we expect it to learn a hierarchy of representations, and that the representations on the last layers
capture relevant properties of signatures. In particular, if the network succeeds in distinguishing
between different users of the development set, then the representation of signatures from these
users will be linearly separable in the representation space defined by φ(X), since the last layer is
a linear classifier with respect to its input φ(X). We test, therefore, the hypothesis that this feature
space generalizes well to signatures from other users.
3.2. Learning features from genuine signatures and skilled forgeries
One limitation of the formulation above is that there is nothing in the training process to drive
the features to be good in distinguishing skilled forgeries. Since this is one of the main goals
of a signature verification system, it would be beneficial to incorporate knowledge about skilled
forgeries in the feature learning process.
In a real application scenario, we cannot expect to have skilled forgeries available for each user
enrolled in the system. We consider, however, a scenario where we obtain skilled forgeries for a
subset of the users. Assuming such forgeries are available, we would like to formulate the feature
learning process to take advantage of this data. Using the same notation as above, we consider
that the development set D contains genuine signatures and skilled forgeries for a set of users,
while the exploitation set E contains only genuine signatures available for training, and represent
the users enrolled to the system.
In this section we introduce novel formulations for the problem, that incorporate forgeries in
the feature learning process. The first approach considers the forgeries of each user as a separate
class, while the second formulation considers a multi-task learning framework.
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3.2.1. Treat forgeries as separate classes
A simple formulation to incorporate knowledge of skilled forgeries into training is to consider
the forgeries of each user as a different class. In this formulation, we have two classes for each
user (genuine signatures and forgeries), that is, M = 2|YD|.
We note that this alternative is somewhat extreme, as it considers genuine signatures and forg-
eries as completely separate entities, while we would expect genuine signatures and skilled forg-
eries to have a high level of resemblance.
3.2.2. Add a separate output for detecting forgeries
Another formulation is to consider a multi-task framework, by considering two terms in the
cost function for feature learning. The first term drives the model to distinguish between different
users (as in the formulations above), while the second term drives the model to distinguish between
genuine signatures and skilled forgeries. Formally, we consider another output of the model:
P (f |X), a single sigmoid unit, that seeks to predict whether or not the signature is a forgery. The
intuition is that in order to classify between genuine signatures and forgeries (regardless of the
user), the network will need to learn visual cues that are particular to each class (e.g. bad line
quality in the pen strokes, often present in forgeries).
We consider a training dataset containing tuples of the form (X , y, f ), whereX is the signature
image, y is the author of the signature (or the target user, if the signature is a forgery), and f is
a binary variable that reflects if the sample is a forgery or not (f = 1 indicates a forgery). Note
that contrary to the previous formulation, genuine signatures and forgeries targeted to the same
user have the same y. For training the model, we consider a loss function that combines both the
classification loss (correctly classifying the user), and a loss on the binary neuron that predicts
whether or not the signature is a forgery. The individual losses are shown in Equation 2, where the
user classification loss (Lc) is a multi-class cross-entropy, and the forgery classification (Lf ) is a
binary cross-entropy:
11
Lc = −
∑
j
yij logP (yj|Xi)
Lf = −fi log(P (f |Xi))− (1− fi) log(1− P (f |Xi))
(2)
For training the model, we combine the two loss functions and minimize both at the same time.
We considered two approaches for combining the losses. The first approach considers a weighted
sum of both individual losses:
L1 = (1− λ)Lc + λLf
= −(1− λ)
∑
j
yij logP (yj|Xi)+
λ
(− fi log(P (f |Xi))− (1− fi) log(1− P (f |Xi)))
(3)
Where λ is a hyperparameter that trades-off between the two objectives (separating the users in
the set D, and detecting forgeries)
In a second approach we consider the user classification loss only for genuine signatures:
L2 = (1− fi)(1− λ)Lc + λLf
= −(1− fi)(1− λ)
∑
j
yij logP (yj|Xi)+
λ
(− fi log(P (f |Xi))− (1− fi) log(1− P (f |Xi)))
(4)
In this case, the model is not penalized for misclassifying for which user a forgery was made.
In both cases, the expectation is that the first term will guide the model to learn features that
can distinguish between different users (i.e. detect random forgeries), while the second term will
focus on particular characteristics that distinguish between genuine signatures and forgeries (such
as limp strokes). It is worth noting that, in the second formulation, using λ = 0 is equivalent to the
formulation in section 3.1, where only genuine signatures are used for training, since the forgeries
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would not contribute to the loss function.
3.3. Preprocessing
The signatures from the datasets used in our experiments are already extracted from the docu-
ments where they were written, so signature extraction is not investigated in this paper. Some few
preprocessing steps are required, though. The neural networks expect inputs of a fixed size, where
signatures vary significantly in shape (in GPDS, they range from small signatures of size 153x258
to large signatures of size 819x1137 pixels).
We first center the signatures in a large canvas of size Scanvas = H×W , by using the signatures’
center of mass. We remove the background using OTSU’s algorithm [31], setting background
pixels to white (intensity 255), and leaving the foreground pixels in grayscale. The image is then
inverted by subtracting each pixel from the maximum brightness I(x, y) = 255 − I(x, y), such
that the background is zero-valued. Lastly, we resize the image to the input size of the network.
3.4. Training the Convolutional Neural Networks
For each strategy described above, we learn a feature representation φ(.) on the Development
set of signatures by training a Deep Convolutional Neural Network on this set. This section de-
scribes the details of the CNN training.
In order to use a suitable architecture for signature verification, in [11] we investigated differ-
ent architectures for learning feature representations using the objective from section 3.1 (training
using only genuine signatures). In this work we use the architecture that performed best for this
formulation, which is described in table 1. The CNN consists of multiple layers, considering the
following operations: convolutions, max-pooling and dot products (fully-connected layers), where
convolutional layers and fully-connected layers have learnable parameters, that are optimized dur-
ing training. With the exception of the last layer in the network, after each learnable layer we apply
Batch Normalization [32], followed by the ReLU non-linearity. The last layer uses the softmax
non-linearity, which is interpreted as P (y|X) - the probability assigned by the network to each
possible user in YD. For the formulation in section 3.2.2, the neuron that estimates P (f |X) uses
the sigmoid function. Both output layers receive as input the result of layer FC7. Table 2 lists the
operations mentioned above.
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Table 1: Summary of the CNN layers
Layer Size Other Parameters
Input 1x150x220
Convolution (C1) 96x11x11 stride = 4, pad=0
Pooling 96x3x3 stride = 2
Convolution (C2) 256x5x5 stride = 1, pad=2
Pooling 256x3x3 stride = 2
Convolution (C3) 384x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Convolution (C4) 384x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Convolution (C5) 256x3x3 stride = 1, pad=1
Pooling 256x3x3 stride = 2
Fully Connected (FC6) 2048
Fully Connected (FC7) 2048
Fully Connected + Softmax (P (y|X)) M
Fully Connected + Sigmoid (P (f |X)) 1
Optimization was conducted by minimizing the loss with Stochastic Gradient Descent with
Nesterov Momentum, using mini-batches of size 32, and momentum factor of 0.9. As regulariza-
tion, we applied L2 penalty with weight decay 10−4. The models were trained for 60 epochs, with
an initial learning rate of 10−3, that was divided by 10 every 20 epochs. We used simple transla-
tions as data augmentation, by using random crops of size 150x220 from the 170x242 signature
image. As in [32], the batch normalization terms (mean and variance) are calculated from the
mini-batches during training. For generalization, the mean (E[zi]) and variance (Var[zi]) for each
neuron were calculated from the entire training set.
It is worth noting that, in our experiments, we found Batch Normalization to be crucial to
train deeper networks. Without using this technique, we could not train architectures with more
than 4 convolutional layers and 2 fully-connected layers. In these cases, the performance in both
a training and validation set remained the same as chance, not indicating overfitting, but rather
problems in the optimization process.
3.5. Training Writer-Dependent Classifiers
After training the CNN, we use the network to extract feature representations for signatures
from the Exploitation set, and train Writer-Dependent classifiers. To do so, we crop the center
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Table 2: List of feedforward operations
Operation Formula
Convolution zl = hl−1 ∗W l
MaxPooling hlxy = maxi=0,..,s,j=0,..,s h
l−1
(x+i)(y+j)
Fully-connected layer zl = W lhl−1
ReLU ReLU(zi) = max(0, zi)
Sigmoid σ(zi) = 11+e−zi
Softmax softmax(zi) = e
zi∑
j e
zj
Batch Normalization BN(zi) = γizˆi + βi,
zˆi =
zi−E[zi]√
Var[zi]
zl: pre-activation output of layer l
hl: activation of layer l
∗: discrete convolution operator
W , γ, β: learnable parameters
150x220 pixels from the 170x242 signature image, perform feedforward propagation until the last
layer before softmax (obtaining φ(X)), and use the activations at that layer as the feature vector
for the image. This can be seen as a form of transfer learning (similar to [28]) between the two sets
of users. For each user, we build a training set consisting of genuine signatures from the user as
positive samples, and genuine signatures from other users as negative samples. We trained Support
Vector Machines (SVM), both in a linear formulation and with the Radial Basis Function (RBF)
kernel.
We used different weights for the positive and negative class to account for the imbalance of
having many more negative samples than positive. The SVM objective becomes [33]:
min
1
2
‖w‖2 + C+
( ∑
i:yi=+1
ξi
)
+ C−
( ∑
i:yi=−1
ξi
)
subject to
yi(wxi + b) ≥ 1− ξi
ξi ≥ 0
(5)
Where the change to the standard SVM formulation is the usage of different weights C for the two
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Table 3: Summary of the datasets used in this work
Dataset Name Users Genuine signatures Forgeries Scanvas
Brazilian (PUC-PR) 60 + 108 40 10 simple, 10 skilled2 700× 1000
CEDAR 55 24 24 730× 1042
MCYT-75 75 15 15 600× 850
GPDS Signature 960 Grayscale 881 24 30 952× 1360
classes (we refer the reader to [33] for the dual formulation). We set the weight of the positive class
(genuine signatures) to match the skew (denoted below as ψ). Let P be the number of positive
(genuine) samples for training, and N the number of negative (random forgery) samples:
ψ =
N
P
C+ = ψC− (6)
For testing, we used a disjoint set of genuine signatures from the user (that is, not used for
training) and the skilled forgeries made targeting the user’s signature.
4. Experimental Protocol
We conducted experiments using the datasets GPDS-960 [9], MCYT-75 [34], CEDAR [35]
and the Brazilian PUC-PR [36]. Table 3 summarizes these datasets, including the size used to
normalize the images in each dataset (height x width). GPDS-960 is the largest publicly avail-
able dataset for offline signature verification with 881 users, having 24 genuine samples and 30
skilled forgeries per user. We used a subset of users from this dataset for learning the features
(the development set D) and evaluating how these features generalize to other users in this dataset
(the exploitation set E). To enable comparison with previous work, we performed experiments on
GPDS having the set E as the first 160 or the first 300 users of the dataset (to allow comparison
with the datasets GPDS-160, and GPDS-300, respectively). In order to evaluate if the features
generalize to other datasets, we use the same models learned on GPDS to train Writer-Dependent
classifiers for the MCYT, CEDAR and Brazilian PUC-PR datasets.
2This dataset contains simple and skilled forgeries for the first 60 users
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Figure 3: The GPDS dataset is separated into an exploitation set E and Development set D. The development set is
used for learning the features, and making all model decisions. The exploitation set represents the users enrolled to
the system, where we train Writer-Dependent classifiers using only genuine signatures.
The GPDS dataset is divided as follows, as illustrated in Figure 3: The Convolutional Neural
Networks are trained on a set Lc (denoting Learning set for classification) consisting of 531 users.
We monitor the progress on a validation set Vc (Validation set for classification). Both sets contains
the same users, but a disjoint set of signature samples from these users. We split 90% of the
signatures for training, and 10% for this validation set.
After the CNNs are trained, we train Writer-Dependent classifiers on a validation set Vv
(Validation set for verification) consisting of 50 users. The purpose of this set is to allow the es-
timation of the performance of Writer-Dependent classifiers trained with the representation space
learned by the CNN. We use this validation set to make all model choices (CNN architecture
and values hyperparameters). On this validation phase, we follow the same protocol for Writer-
Dependent classifier training, using a fixed number of 12 genuine signatures for the user as positive
samples, and random forgeries from Lc as negative samples.
Finally, we use the models and hyperparameters that performed best in the validation set, to
train and test classifiers for the exploitation set E . We trained Support Vector Machines on the set
Lv (denoting Learning set for verification) and tested on Tv (Testing set for verification). For each
user, we build a dataset consisting of r genuine signatures from the user as positive samples, and
genuine signatures from other users as negative samples. Taking into consideration the differences
in datasets and experimental protocols that used them in the literature, we used a different number
of signatures for training and testing, which is summarized in table 4. For the GPDS and the
Brazilian PUC-PR datasets, we used signatures from users that are not in the Exploitation set as
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Table 4: Separation into training and testing for each dataset
Dataset Name Training set Testing set
Genuine Random Forgeries
Brazilian (PUC-PR) r ∈ {1, . . . , 30} 30× 108 = 3240 10 genuine, 10 random, 10 simple, 10 skilled
CEDAR r ∈ {1, . . . , 12} 12× 54 = 648 10 genuine, 10 skilled
MCYT-75 r ∈ {1, . . . , 10} 10× 74 = 588 5 genuine, 15 skilled
GPDS-160 r ∈ {1, . . . , 14} 14× 721 = 10094 10 genuine, 10 random, 10 skilled
GPDS-300 r ∈ {1, . . . , 14} 14× 581 = 8134 10 genuine, 10 random, 10 skilled
random forgeries (i.e. signatures from users 301-881 for GPDS-300 and users 61-168 for the
Brazilian PUC-PR). For MCYT and CEDAR, we consider genuine samples from other users from
the exploitation set as negative samples for training the WD classifier. In each experiment, we
performed the WD training 10 times, using different splits for the data. We report the mean and
variance of the performance across these executions.
We used the same hyperparameters for training the SVM classifiers as in previous work [11]:
for the linear SVM, we used C− = 1 (C+ is calculated according to equation 6). For the SVM
with RBF kernel, we used C− = 1 and γ = 2−11. We found these hyperparameters to work
well for the problem, on a range of architectures and users, but we note that they could be further
optimized (to each model, or even to each user), which is not explored in this study.
For learning features using forgery data, specifically the formulation on section 3.2.2, we tested
values of λ from 0 to 1 is steps of 0.1. The boundaries are special cases: with λ = 0, the forgery
neuron is not used at all, and the model only classifies among different users; with λ = 1 the
model does no try to separate among different users, but only classifies whether or not the input is
a forgery. In our experiments, we found better results on the right end of this range, and therefore
we refined the search for the appropriate λ with the following cases: λ ∈ {0.95, 0.99, 0.999}.
Besides comparing the performance with the state-of-the-art in this dataset, we also consid-
ered a baseline consisted of a CNN pre-trained on the Imagenet dataset. As argued in [37], these
pre-trained models offer a strong baseline for Computer Vision tasks. We used two pre-trained
models3, namely Caffenet (Caffe reference network, based on AlexNet [25]), and VGG-19 [38].
3https://github.com/BVLC/caffe/wiki/Model-Zoo
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We used these networks to extract the feature representations φ(X) for signatures, and followed
the same protocol for training Writing-Dependent classifiers using these representations. We con-
sidered the following layers to obtain the representations: pool5, fc6 and fc7.
We evaluate the performance on the testing set using the following metrics: False Rejec-
tion Rate (FRR): the fraction of genuine signatures rejected as forgeries; False Acceptance Rate
(FARrandom and FARskilled): the fraction of forgeries accepted as genuine (considering random forg-
eries and skilled forgeries). We also report the Equal Error Rate (EER): which is the error when
FAR = FRR. We considered two forms of calculating the EER: EERuser thresholds: using user-specific
decision thresholds; and EERglobal threshold: using a global decision threshold. In both cases, to cal-
culate the Equal Error Rate we only considered skilled forgeries (not random forgeries) - that is,
we use only FRR and FARskilled to estimate the optimum threshold and report the Equal Error Rate.
We also report the mean Area Under the Curve (AUC), considering ROC curves created for each
user individually. For calculating FAR and FRR in the GPDS exploitation set, we used a deci-
sion threshold selected from the validation set Vv (the threshold that achieved EER using a global
decision threshold).
For the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset, we followed the convention of previous research in this
dataset, and also report the individual errors (False Rejection Rate and False Acceptance Rate for
different types of forgery) and the Average error rate, calculate as AER = (FRR + FARrandom +
FARsimple + FARskilled)/4. Since in this work we are mostly interested in the problem of distin-
guishing genuine signatures and skilled forgeries, we also report AERgenuine + skilled = (FRR +
FARskilled)/2.
5. Results and Discussion
The experimental results with the proposed method are listed and discussed in this section.
The first part presents the experiments on the Development set, which was used for making all the
design decisions for the proposed method: evaluating different loss functions and other hyperpa-
rameters. The second part presents the results on the Exploitation set, and the comparison with the
state-of-the-art for all four datasets.
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5.1. Signature Verification System Design
In these experiments, we trained the CNN architectures using the loss functions defined in
section 3, used them to extract features for the users in the validation set Vv, and trained Writer-
Dependent classifiers for these users using 12 reference signatures. We then analyzed the impact
in classification performance of the different formulations of the problem.
For the formulation on section 3.2.2, where we have a separate neuron to estimate if a signature
is a forgery or not, we trained models with variable values of λ. Figure 4 shows the results on the
validation set using loss L1 (from equation 3), and loss L2 (from equation 4). The models with
loss L2 only consider the user-classification loss for genuine signatures, while the models using
L1 consider user-classification loss for all signatures (genuine and forgeries). As a performance
reference, we also show the results using a model trained with genuine signatures only, as well as
the model trained with forgeries as separate classes (sec 3.2.1).
Both using a linear SVM or using an SVM with RBF kernel, the results using the loss L1 were
very poor for low values of λ. This is likely caused by the fact that, in this formulation, both
genuine signatures and forgeries of the same user are assigned to the same class y, and the loss
function guides the model to be less discriminative between the genuine signatures and forgeries of
the same user. This behavior is not present when we use the loss L2, since the model is not penal-
ized for misclassifying for which user the forgery was created. We also noticed that the best results
were closer to the right end of the range, suggesting that the distinction of forgeries (regardless of
the user) in the development set may be more relevant than the distinguishing genuine signatures
from different users. In the extreme case, with λ = 1, the model is only learning to discriminate
between genuine signatures and forgeries (the output is a single binary unit), and the performance
is still reasonable, although worse than the performance when both loss functions are combined.
It is worth noting that the scale of Lc is larger than Lf by definition: Lc is a cross-entropy loss
among 531 users. A random classifier would have loss Lc ≈ log(531) ≈ 6.27. On the other hand,
Lf is a cross-entropy loss among 2 alternatives, and a random classifier would have loss around
Lf ≈ log(2) ≈ 0.69, which also partially explains larger λ values.
We noticed an unexpected behavior using loss L2 with λ = 0. This loss function is equiv-
alent to the loss when using only genuine signatures, but actually performed worse during our
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Figure 4: Performance on the validation set (Vv), using features learned from genuine signatures and forgeries (sec
3.2.2), as we vary the hyperparameter λ. For reference, the performance of models using features learned from
genuine signatures only (sec 3.1) and using forgeries as different classes (sec 3.2.1) are also included.
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Table 5: Performance of the WD classifiers on the validation set Vv (subset of 50 users in GPDS; Errors and Standard
deviations in %)
Classifier Formulation used to learn the features EERglobal threshold EERuser thresholds Mean AUC
Linear SVM Baseline (Caffenet, layer pool5) 14.09 (+- 2.80) 10.59 (+- 2.96) 0.9453 (+- 0.0198)
Using genuine signatures only (sec 3.1) 6.80 (+- 0.57) 3.91 (+- 0.64) 0.9876 (+- 0.0022)
Forgeries as separate classes (sec 3.2.1) 9.45 (+- 0.51) 5.61 (+- 0.63) 0.9749 (+- 0.0028)
Forgery neuron (sec 3.2.2, loss L1, λ = 0.999) 7.01 (+- 0.42) 3.63 (+- 0.43) 0.9844 (+- 0.0024)
Forgery neuron (sec 3.2.2, loss L2, λ = 0.95) 6.09 (+- 0.29) 3.17 (+- 0.34) 0.9899 (+- 0.0017)
SVM (RBF) Baseline (Caffenet, layer fc6) 16.20 (+- 0.94) 13.51 (+- 0.99) 0.9261 (+- 0.0054)
Using genuine signatures only (sec 3.1) 5.93 (+- 0.43) 3.13 (+- 0.46) 0.9903 (+- 0.0018)
Forgeries as separate classes (sec 3.2.1) 7.79 (+- 0.43) 4.10 (+- 0.41) 0.9857 (+- 0.0012)
Forgery neuron (sec 3.2.2, loss L1, λ = 1) 2.41 (+- 0.32) 1.08 (+- 0.36) 0.9978 (+- 0.0008)
Forgery neuron (sec 3.2.2, loss L2, λ = 0.999) 2.51 (+- 0.33) 1.04 (+- 0.31) 0.9971 (+- 0.0009)
experiments. Analyzing this abnormal behavior, we identified that, although the forgeries do not
contribute to the loss function directly, they do have some indirect effect on loss function due to
the usage of batch normalization. During training, the skilled forgeries are used, together with
genuine signatures, when computing the batch statistics (mean and variance), therefore affecting
the output of the network. However, it is unclear why this effect results in worse performance,
instead of simply adding more variance to the results.
We also verified if the forgery neuron generalized well to other users. Since this neuron is not
related to a particular user in the development set, we can use it to estimate P (f |X) for signature
images from other users. In this case, we estimate if a signature is a forgery only by looking at the
questioned specimen, and not comparing it to other genuine signatures from the same user. We
used the neuron trained with loss L2 and λ = 0.999 to classify all signatures from the validation
set Vv, achieving an error rate of 14.37%. In comparison, for classifying signatures from the
same set of users where the CNN was trained (i.e. testing on Vc), the model achieved 2.21% of
error. This suggests that using this neuron is mostly helpful to guide the system to obtain better
representations (and subsequently train WD classifiers), than to use it directly as a classifier for
new samples, since it mainly generalizes to other signatures from the same users used to train the
CNN.
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Table 5 consolidates the performance obtained in the validation set Vv using the proposed
methods. The baseline, using a CNN pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset, performed reasonably
well compared to previous work on the GPDS dataset, but still much worse than the methods
that learned on signature data. An interesting result is that the naive formulation to use forgeries
(treat forgeries as separate classes - section 3.2.1) performed worse than the formulation that used
only genuine signatures for training the CNN. Using the model trained with genuine signatures,
we obtained EER of 3.91% using a linear SVM, and 3.13% using the RBF kernel. Using the
model trained with forgeries as separate classes, we obtained EER of 5.61% using Linear SVM
and 4.10% using the RBF kernel. A possible explanation for this effect is that this formulation
effectively doubles the number of classes, making the classification problem much harder. This
fact, combined with the observation that genuine signatures and forgeries for the same user usually
share several characteristics, may justify this drop in performance. On the other hand, the formu-
lation using the forgery neuron performed much better in the validation set, showing that this is
a promising formulation of the problem. We reiterate that forgeries are used only in the feature
learning process, and that no forgeries from the validation set Vv were used for training.
Although it is not the focus of this paper, we note that these models could also be used for user
identification from signatures. Using the features learned from genuine signatures only (sec 3.1),
the performance on the validation set Vc (classification between the 531 users) is 99.23%, showing
that using CNNs for this task is very effective.
5.1.1. Visualizing the learned representation space
We performed an analysis of the feature space learned by the models, by using the t-SNE
algorithm [39] to project the samples from the validation set Vv from RN to R2. This analysis is
useful to examine the local structure present in this high-dimensionality space. For this analysis,
we used the baseline model (Caffenet, using features from layer pool5), a model learned with
genuine signatures only, and a model learned with genuine signatures and forgeries (using loss L2
and λ = 0.95). These models were trained on the set Lc, which is a disjoint set of users from
the validation set. In all cases, we used the models to “extract features” from all 1200 signatures
images from the validation set, by performing forward propagation until the layer specified above.
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(a) Baseline (Features learned on
Imagenet)
(b) Using only genuine signatures
to learn the features
(c) Using genuine signatures and
forgeries to learn the features
Figure 5: 2D projections (using t-SNE) of the feature vectors from the 50 users in the validation set Vv . Each point
represents a signature sample: genuine signatures are displayed in blue (dark), while skilled forgeries are displayed in
orange (light).
For the baseline model, this representation is in R9216, while for the other models it is in R2048.
For each model, we used the t-SNE algorithm to project the samples to 2 dimensions.
The result can be seen in Figure 5. The baseline system (model trained on natural images)
projects the samples onto a space where samples from different users are clustered in separate re-
gions of the space, which is is quite interesting considering that this network was never presented
signature images. On the other hand, skilled forgeries are also clustered together with genuine
signatures in this representation. On the models trained with signature data, we can see that sig-
natures from different users also occupy different regions of the feature space. Using the model
trained with genuine signatures and forgeries, we see that the forgeries from the users in the vali-
dation set are much more grouped together in a part of the feature space, although several forgeries
are still close to the genuine signatures of the users. This suggests that the network has learned
characteristics that are intrinsic to many forgeries, that generalizes to other users.
5.2. Generalization performance and comparison with the state-of-the-art
We now present the results on the exploitation set, comparing the results with the state-of-
the-art. In these experiments, we do not use any skilled forgeries from the users, since it is not
reasonable to expect skilled forgeries to be available for all users enrolled in the system.
We reiterate that all design decisions (e.g. choice of architecture and other hyperparameters)
were done using the validation set Vv, which consists of a separate set of users, to present an
unbiased estimate of the performance of the classifier in the testing set. In these experiments, we
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Table 6: Detailed performance of the WD classifiers on the GPDS-160 and GPDS-300 datasets (Errors and Standard
Deviations in %)
Dataset Samples per user Classifier FRR FAR_random FAR_skilled EERglobal threshold EERuser thresholds meanAUC
GPDS-160 5 SVM (Linear) 9.09 (+- 0.65) 0.01 (+- 0.03) 5.75 (+- 0.12) 7.30 (+- 0.35) 3.52 (+- 0.28) 0.9880 (+- 0.0013)
SVM (RBF) 5.16 (+- 0.41) 0.06 (+- 0.04) 5.17 (+- 0.17) 5.15 (+- 0.22) 2.41 (+- 0.12) 0.9924 (+- 0.0011)
12 SVM (Linear) 6.39 (+- 0.67) 0.01 (+- 0.02) 3.96 (+- 0.18) 5.15 (+- 0.28) 2.60 (+- 0.39) 0.9922 (+- 0.0010)
SVM (RBF) 3.59 (+- 0.23) 0.02 (+- 0.03) 3.66 (+- 0.15) 3.61 (+- 0.07) 1.72 (+- 0.15) 0.9952 (+- 0.0006)
GPDS-300 5 SVM (Linear) 9.28 (+- 0.36) 0.01 (+- 0.02) 8.18 (+- 0.23) 8.68 (+- 0.22) 4.84 (+- 0.26) 0.9792 (+- 0.0016)
SVM (RBF) 6.03 (+- 0.45) 0.04 (+- 0.04) 4.68 (+- 0.18) 5.25 (+- 0.15) 2.42 (+- 0.24) 0.9923 (+- 0.0007)
12 SVM (Linear) 6.80 (+- 0.31) 0.00 (+- 0.01) 6.16 (+- 0.17) 6.44 (+- 0.17) 3.56 (+- 0.18) 0.9857 (+- 0.0010)
SVM (RBF) 3.94 (+- 0.29) 0.02 (+- 0.02) 3.53 (+- 0.11) 3.74 (+- 0.15) 1.69 (+- 0.18) 0.9951 (+- 0.0004)
used the architectures that performed best in the validation set, as seen in Table 5. In particular, we
consider a model that was learned using genuine signatures only (sec 3.1), which we call simply
by SigNet in this section. We also consider a model learned using genuine signatures and forgeries
(sec 3.2.2), using loss L2, which we call SigNet-F. For the experiments with a linear SVM, we
used the model learned with λ = 0.95, while for the experiments with the SVM with the RBF
kernel, we used the model learned with λ = 0.999.
5.2.1. Experiments on GPDS-160 and GPDS-300
For these experiments, we used the models SigNet and SigNet-F to extract features of the ex-
ploitation set (GPDS-160 and GPDS-300), and trained Writer-Dependent classifiers. To report the
False Rejection Rate and False Acceptance Rates, we used the validation set to find the optimum
global threshold (the threshold that obtained EERglobal threshold on the validation set Vv) as a global
threshold for all users. In this work, we do not explore techniques for setting user-specific thresh-
olds, but simply report EERuser thresholds, which is the equal error rate obtained by using the optimal
decision thresholds for each user.
Table 6 lists the detailed results on the GPDS-160 and GPDS-300 datasets, for experiments
using SigNet-F. We notice that the using only 5 samples per user already achieves a good average
performance on these datasets, showing that the proposed strategy works well with low number
of samples per user. We also note that the performance using user-specific thresholds is much
better than using a single global threshold (1.72% vs 3.61%) in the GPDS-160 dataset, which is
consistent with previous findings that the definition of user-specific thresholds is key in obtaining
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Table 7: Comparison with state-of-the art on the GPDS dataset (errors in %)
Reference Dataset
#samples
per user
Features EER
Hu and Chen [5] GPDS-150 10 LBP, GLCM, HOG 7.66
Guerbai et al [40] GPDS-160 12 Curvelet transform 15.07
Serdouk et al [41] GPDS-100 16 GLBP, LRF 12.52
Yilmaz [4] GPDS-160 5 LBP, HOG, SIFT 7.98
Yilmaz [4] GPDS-160 12 LBP, HOG, SIFT 6.97
Soleimani et al [20] GPDS-300 10 LBP 20.94
Present Work GPDS-160 5 SigNet 3.23 (+-0.36)
Present Work GPDS-160 12 SigNet 2.63 (+-0.36)
Present Work GPDS-300 5 SigNet 3.92 (+-0.18)
Present Work GPDS-300 12 SigNet 3.15 (+-0.18)
Present Work GPDS-160 5 SigNet-F 2.41 (+-0.12)
Present Work GPDS-160 12 SigNet-F 1.72 (+-0.15)
Present Work GPDS-300 5 SigNet-F 2.42 (+-0.24)
Present Work GPDS-300 12 SigNet-F 1.69 (+-0.18)
a good performance.
We notice that the performance using a linear classifier (Linear SVM) is already good, which
is interesting from a practical perspective for a large-scale deployment. Since the CNN model is
the same for all users, adding new users to the system requires only training the WD classifier. For
a linear classifier, this requires only one weight per dimension (plus a bias term), adding to 2049
doubles to be stored (16KB per user). For the SVM with RBF kernel, the storage requirements
for each user depends on the number of support vectors. In the GPDS-300 dataset, in average the
classifiers used 75 support vectors. Since the set of random forgeries is the same for all users, most
of these support vectors will be shared among different users. On the other hand, we noticed that
the majority of genuine signatures were selected as support vectors (as expected) - in average 10.3
genuine signatures, when using 12 references for training.
Table 7 compares our results with the state-of-the-art on the GPDS dataset. We observed a
large improvement in verification performance, obtaining 1.72% EER on GPDS-160, compared
to a state-of-the-art of 6.97%, both using 12 samples per user for training. We also note that this
result is obtained with a single classifier, while the best results in the state-of-the-art use ensembles
of many classifiers. As in the experiments in the validation set, we notice an improvement in
26
Table 8: Comparison with the state-of-the-art in MCYT
Reference # Samples Features EER
Gilperez et al.[42] 5 Contours (chi squared distance) 10.18
Gilperez et al.[42] 10 Contours (chi squared distance) 6.44
Wen et al.[43] 5 RPF (HMM) 15.02
Vargas et al.[44] 5 LBP (SVM) 11.9
Vargas et al.[44] 10 LBP (SVM) 7.08
Ooi et al[45] 5 DRT + PCA (PNN) 13.86
Ooi et al[45] 10 DRT + PCA (PNN) 9.87
Soleimani et al.[20] 5 HOG (DMML) 13.44
Soleimani et al.[20] 10 HOG (DMML) 9.86
Proposed 5 SigNet (SVM) 3.58 (+- 0.54)
Proposed 10 SigNet (SVM) 2.87 (+- 0.42)
Proposed 5 SigNet-F (SVM) 3.70 (+- 0.79)
Proposed 10 SigNet-F (SVM) 3.00 (+- 0.56)
Table 9: Comparison with the state-of-the-art in CEDAR
Reference # Samples Features AER/EER
Chen and Srihari[46] 16 Graph Matching 7.9
Kumar et al.[47] 1 morphology (SVM) 11.81
Kumar et al.[48] 1 Surroundness (NN) 8.33
Bharathi and Shekar[49] 12 Chain code (SVM) 7.84
Guerbai et al.[40] 4 Curvelet transform (OC-SVM) 8.7
Guerbai et al.[40] 8 Curvelet transform (OC-SVM) 7.83
Guerbai et al.[40] 12 Curvelet transform (OC-SVM) 5.6
Proposed 4 SigNet (SVM) 5.87 (+- 0.73)
Proposed 8 SigNet (SVM) 5.03 (+- 0.75)
Proposed 12 SigNet (SVM) 4.76 (+- 0.36)
Proposed 4 SigNet-F (SVM) 5.92 (+- 0.48)
Proposed 8 SigNet-F (SVM) 4.77 (+- 0.76)
Proposed 12 SigNet-F (SVM) 4.63 (+- 0.42)
performance using SigNet-F to extract the features compared to using SigNet.
5.2.2. Generalizing to other datasets
We now consider the generalization performance of the features learned in GPDS to other
datasets. We use the same networks, namely SigNet and SigNet-F, for extracting features and
training Writer-Dependent classifiers on MCYT, CEDAR and the Brazilian PUC-PR datasets.
Tables 8, 9 and 10 present the comparison with the state-of-the-art performance on MCYT,
CEDAR and Brazilian PUC-PR, respectively. In all datasets we notice improvement in perfor-
mance compared to the state-of-the-art, suggesting that the features learned on GPDS generalize
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Table 10: Comparison with the state-of-the-art on the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset (errors in %)
Reference
#samples
per user
Features FRR FARrandom FARsimple FARskilled AER AERgenuine + skilled EERgenuine + skilled
Bertolini et al. [8] 15 Graphometric 10.16 3.16 2.8 6.48 5.65 8.32 -
Batista et al. [50] 30 Pixel density 7.5 0.33 0.5 13.5 5.46 10.5 -
Rivard et al. [6] 15 ESC + DPDF 11 0 0.19 11.15 5.59 11.08 -
Eskander et al. [7] 30 ESC + DPDF 7.83 0.02 0.17 13.5 5.38 10.67 -
Present Work 5 SigNet 4.63 (+- 0.55) 0.00 (+- 0.00) 0.35 (+- 0.20) 7.17 (+- 0.51) 3.04 (+- 0.17) 5.90 (+- 0.32) 2.92 (+- 0.44)
Present Work 15 SigNet 1.22 (+- 0.63) 0.02 (+- 0.05) 0.43 (+- 0.09) 10.70 (+- 0.39) 3.09 (+- 0.20) 5.96 (+- 0.40) 2.07 (+- 0.63)
Present Work 30 SigNet 0.23 (+- 0.18) 0.02 (+- 0.05) 0.67 (+- 0.08) 12.62 (+- 0.22) 3.38 (+- 0.06) 6.42 (+- 0.13) 2.01 (+- 0.43)
Present Work 5 SigNet-F 17.17 (+- 0.68) 0.00 (+- 0.00) 0.03 (+- 0.07) 2.72 (+- 0.37) 4.98 (+- 0.16) 9.94 (+- 0.31) 5.11 (+- 0.89)
Present Work 15 SigNet-F 9.25 (+- 0.88) 0.00 (+- 0.00) 0.25 (+- 0.09) 6.55 (+- 0.37) 4.01 (+- 0.24) 7.90 (+- 0.46) 4.03 (+- 0.59)
Present Work 30 SigNet-F 5.47 (+- 0.46) 0.00 (+- 0.00) 0.38 (+- 0.11) 8.80 (+- 0.44) 3.66 (+- 0.12) 7.13 (+- 0.25) 3.44 (+- 0.37)
well to signatures from other datasets (with different protocols for signature acquisition, created
with different users in different countries). We also note that other methods proposed in the litera-
ture often present better performance only in one dataset, for instance, Guerbai et al. [40] obtained
good results on CEDAR, but poor results on GPDS; Soleimani et al. [20] obtained good results on
MCYT, but not on GPDS. The proposed method, however, obtained state-of-the-art performance
in all datasets. For MCYT we obtained EER of 2.87% compared to 6.44% in the literature. On
CEDAR, we obtained EER of 4.63%, compared to 5.6%. For the Brazilian PUC-PR dataset, we
notice an improvement in performance both in terms of average error rate (considering all types
of forgery), and the average error rate comparing only genuine signatures and skilled forgeries. It
is worth noting that in these experiments we used a global threshold = 0 to report FRR and FAR,
since we did not have a validation set to learn the appropriate global threshold, hence the large
differences between FRR and FARskilled.
We also noticed that the formulation that learned features using skilled forgeries from the
GPDS dataset did not perform better in all cases. For MCYT and CEDAR the performance be-
tween SigNet and SigNet-F was not significantly different, whereas for the Brazilian PUC-PR
dataset it obtained worse performance than SigNet. This suggests that the representation may
have specialized to traits present in the forgeries made for the GPDS dataset, which depend on the
acquisition protocol, such as if only one type of writing instrument was used, and the directions
given to participants to create the forgeries. We note, however, that 1920 people participated in
creating forgeries for the GPDS dataset [9].
28
Finally, considering that the MCYT dataset contains both an Offline dataset (with static sig-
nature images, as used in this paper), and an Online version (with dynamic information of the
strokes), it is possible to compare the two approaches to the problem. In the literature, online sig-
nature verification systems empirically demonstrate better performance than offline systems [2],
which is often attributed to the lack of dynamic information of the signature writing process in
the offline signatures. The gains in performance using the method proposed in this paper reduce
the gap between the two approaches. Using offline signatures, we obtained 2.87 % EERuser thresholds
using 10 samples per user. Using online data, the best results reported in the literature achieve 2.85
% EER [51] and 3.36 % EER [52], also using 10 samples per user. We note, however, that in our
work we do not address the issue of selecting user-specific thresholds (or performing user-specific
score normalization), which is left as future work. In constrast, both [51] and [52] use score nor-
malization, followed by a single global threshold, so the comparison of these papers to our work
is not direct.
5.2.3. Varying the number of genuine samples available for training
Figure 6 shows the improvement in performance on the four datasets as we obtain more sam-
ples per user for training. Each point represents the performance of the WD classifiers trained with
a given number of genuine samples (mean and standard deviation across 10 replications). As in
previous work ([7], [10]), we notice diminishing returns as we collect more samples for each user.
It is worth noting that in the GPDS dataset, even with a single sample per user we obtain 5.74%
EER, which surpasses the state-of-the-art system that used 12 samples per user, showing that good
feature representations are indeed critical to obtain good performance.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we presented different formulations for learning representations for offline sig-
nature verification. We showed that features learned in a writer-independent way can be very
effective for signature verification, improving performance on the task, compared to the methods
that rely on hand-engineered features.
In particular, we showed a formulation of the problem to take advantage of having forgery
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Figure 6: Average performance of the Writer-Dependent classifiers for each dataset, as we vary the number of genuine
signatures (per user) available for training.
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data from a subset of users, so that the learned features perform better in distinguishing forgeries
for unseen users. With this formulation, we obtain an EER or 1.72% in the GPDS-160 dataset,
compared to 6.97% reported in the literature. The visual analysis of the feature space shows
that the features generalize well to unseen users, by separating genuine signatures and forgeries in
different regions of the representation space. We also noted very good performance of this strategy
even when few samples per user are available. For instance, with 5 samples per user, we obtained
2.41 % EER on this dataset.
The experiments with the MCYT, CEDAR and Brazilian PUC-PR datasets demonstrate that
the features learned in this Writer-Independent format not only generalize to different users of the
GPDS dataset, but also to users from other datasets, surpassing the state-of-the-art performance
on all three. We noticed, however, that the model learned with forgeries in the GPDS dataset did
not perform better in all cases, suggesting that the characteristics of forgeries in the datasets may
be different - this will be further studied in future work. Another promising research direction is
the combination of online and offline signature verification methods. This can improve robustness
of the system since it becomes harder to create a forgery that is misclassified by both classifiers,
that is, a forgery having similar strokes in terms of speed of execution, and at the same time that is
visually similar to a genuine signature from the user.
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